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Electric vehicles (EVs) are key to U.S. plans to transition to a green economy that is powered by 
renewable energy rather than fossil fuels. There has been extensive research documenting the 
adverse socio-ecological impacts of resource extraction for EVs, including water shortages 
driven by lithium mining on Indigenous lands in South America and child labor in cobalt mining 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, little research has attended to the ways that 
automakers and utility companies shape the adoption of EVs through the use of corporate 
narratives and strategies. In this thesis, I introduce the concept of points of continuity, whereby 
specific aspects of the gasoline vehicle user experience are mimicked by the EV industry to 
increase adoption of EVs. This desire to adopt behavioral similarities between gasoline and 
electric vehicles allows for existing patterns of automobile production and consumption to be 
maintained. However, in order to establish points of continuity, EV industry actors must navigate 
material constraints imposed by the physical properties of electric power. Through this case 
study, I demonstrate that the production of points of continuity is a method through which the 





On March 31st, 2021, United States President Joseph R. Biden released the American 
Jobs Plan, a bill proposing massive infrastructure investment widely viewed as a cornerstone 
project of his administration. Particularly notable among the wide swath of planned investments 
is the plan’s emphasis on electric vehicles (EVs). The American Jobs Plan allocates $174 
billion—more than is allocated for public transportation and passenger rail combined—for point-
of-sale and tax rebates for EV purchases, as well as buildout of a national network of 500,000 
EV chargers by 2030 (White House 2021). 
Because of these and other clean energy investments, the American Jobs Plan is already 
being referred to by advocacy groups as one step toward a “green economy”—that is, an 
economy predicated on renewable energies rather than fossil fuels (Loiseau et al. 2016, 
Georgeson et al. 2017). In the United States, the emergence of EVs as a means of decarbonizing 
transportation is a key component of the green economy. However, green economy narratives 
often obscure inequalities and exploitation in “green” industries, contributing to a Western-
centric green capitalism that maintains and is dependent on these inequalities. Although 
automakers and electric utilities have begun to invest substantially in EVs, the strategies they 
employ may reinforce existing sociopolitical relations around car production and consumption, 
obscuring patterns of exploitation and ecological damage along the complex supply chains that 
EVs depend on. These harms can be conceptualized as environmental violence: ecological 
degradation and the human exploitation that often accompanies it (Lee 2016). 
The materialities of energy—in other words, the physical and social properties of 
particular forms of energy—are influential in shaping the sociopolitical relations that lead to 
environmental violence. For example, scholars have drawn attention to the ways that material 
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properties of oil, such as its depth in the earth and its viscosity, have shaped the way oil 
companies create infrastructure, interact with labor and regulatory regimes, and respond to 
criticism (Bridge 2010, Mitchell 2011, Rogers 2012). By studying oil’s materialities, scholars 
have articulated political ecologies of oil and extractive infrastructure, contributing to a better 
understanding of the social formations constructed by different energy regimes (Adunbi 2020, 
Valdivia 2015). As transportation electrification continues to gain traction in the global energy 
landscape, studying electricity’s materialities can help uncover the ways that these materialities 
shape the political and social landscape around EVs. This can contribute to an understanding of 
what Cederlöf (2019, pp. 79) calls “energopower:” the ways that “particular configurations of 
energy and political power shape the conditions of social, political, and economic possibility.” 
In this paper, I will show how materialities of electricity affect the ways that automakers 
and utilities attempt to produce the notion of a “clean” green capitalism that maintains an 
emphasis on existing modes of consumption. I introduce the concept of points of continuity: 
specific aspects of the gasoline vehicle user experience that the EV industry seeks to replicate in 
EVs in order to increase adoption. As automakers and utilities create points of continuity 
between gasoline and electric vehicles which allow them to maintain existing patterns of 
automobile production and consumption, they must navigate materialities of electricity that 
affect how these points can be established. Through this case study, I will demonstrate that 
constructing points of continuity is a method by which the environmental violence of green 
capitalism is maintained.  
My findings are based on a review of the literature as well as semi-structured interviews 
with key informants working in EV infrastructure development for utilities, automakers, and 
consulting firms. I begin by tracing the EV supply chain and situating the EV industry within the 
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green economy. Next, I provide an overview of existing conceptions of materialities of 
electricity. Finally, through data from my interviews, I explore the ways that automakers and 
electric utilities create points of continuity as they shape the EV industry, how materialities of 
electricity affect the ways in which this occurs, and how this affects sites of environmental 
violence. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings and suggesting alternative 
pathways for transportation decarbonization that foreground global environmental justice. 
2. The Electric Vehicle Supply Chain 
 Electric vehicles are manufactured relatively similarly to their fossil fuel-powered 
internal combustion engine (ICE) counterparts. Components are purchased through a global 
supply chain of vendors and sources. These components are then assembled at an automaker’s 
plant. Major automakers typically have assembly facilities in various countries that produce 
different models available in their respective markets; each of these plants may source 
components and materials from vendors across the world. 
The primary point of divergence between the manufacturing processes of EVs and ICE 
vehicles is the battery used to power EVs. Batteries are a key determinant of a vehicle’s range, 
cost, and longevity: in particular, range is a key selling point for consumers, as demonstrated by 
its prominence in EV advertising (Fig. 1). Like internal combustion engines, the electric motors 
that power the wheels of an EV are typically manufactured in-house by automakers (Adams 
2018). However, the batteries that power the motors are reliant on their own sophisticated supply 
chain and manufacturing process. This is in large part due to the raw materials required to 
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manufacture batteries: metals such as lithium, cobalt, and nickel that must be mined from the 
earth. 
 
Figure 1: Advertising for the Tesla Model 3, Chevrolet Bolt, and Polestar 2 EVs that focuses on range. Captured from 
manufacturer websites123 
Mining sites are geographically disparate; major lithium deposits exist in Argentina, 
Chile, Bolivia, and Australia, while more than 60 percent of the world’s cobalt reserves are 
located in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Extensive nickel reserves can be found in 
Australia, Brazil, and Indonesia (U.S. Geological Survey 2019). Mining operations are resource-
heavy affairs that are typically handled by multinational corporations; for example, the global 






oligopoly (Maxwell 2015). After extraction, these metals are purchased by and shipped to battery 
cell manufacturers. These facilities are typically located closer to or inside auto manufacturing 
facilities. For example, battery cell manufacturer LG Chem has plants in Holland, Michigan and 
Lordstown, Ohio that supply General Motors plants in the midwestern United States (Kim 2020), 
while Tesla has a contract with Panasonic to produce battery cells within their Nevada 
Gigafactory (Lambert 2020). The battery packs are assembled from these cells and installed into 
production vehicles onsite by automobile manufacturers, as the size and weight of the completed 
packs would make them difficult to transport (Coffin and Horowitz 2018). Figure 2 shows a map 
of EV manufacturing facilities and sites of lithium, nickel, and cobalt extraction from which their 
batteries are sourced. 
Figure 2: Map of assembly plants, battery plants, and mines. List of mines is inexhaustive; data from various web sources.45678 
 
4 Assembly plant locations: https://www.tesla.com/factory, 
https://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/company_info/facilities/assembly/orion.html 
5 Battery plant locations: https://www.tesla.com/gigafactory, https://nsjonline.com/article/2020/11/gm-recalling-nearly-69k-bolt-
electric-cars-due-to-fire-risk/ 
6 Lithium mining locations: https://www.globalxetfs.com/four-companies-leading-the-rise-of-lithium-battery-technology, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sqm-electric-lithium/sqm-announces-8-year-deal-to-supply-lithium-to-lg-energy-solution-
idUSKBN28W1DR 
7 Cobalt mining locations: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tesla-congo-breakingviews/breakingviews-tesla-kills-three-birds-
with-one-congolese-stone-idUSKBN23O1JX, https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2183701-south-koreas-lg-chem-posts-
higher-2020-battery-sales 
8 Nickel mining locations: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56288781, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-
14/top-battery-makers-in-talks-over-20-billion-indonesia-ev-plans 
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There remain many sites of exploitation along this global supply chain. Increased lithium 
mining has led to water shortages, soil contamination, and the dispossession of Indigenous 
peoples that live near lithium extraction sites (Dominish et al. 2019). Due to the concentration of 
lithium deposits on rural and Indigenous land and in the Global South, these exploitative effects 
are unevenly distributed. Although Tesla is pursuing lithium extraction in the United States 
(Huguley 2020, Scheyder 2020), these efforts are in their infancy and will likely only supplement 
global lithium extraction for the foreseeable future. Additionally, environmental justice and 
Indigenous land rights remain significant concerns at these sites as well: the Fort McDermitt 
Paiute-Shoshone Tribe and local ranchers are fighting the Thacker Pass lithium mining project in 
northern Nevada over concerns about the project’s threats to water and sacred lands (Deep Green 
Resistance 2021). 
The extraction of other metals presents similar concerns. Amnesty International (2016) 
documented extensive human rights violations in cobalt mining in the DRC, including hazardous 
working conditions and the use of child labor. Due in part to extensive human rights concerns 
around cobalt mining, some EV manufacturers such as Tesla are moving away from cobalt and 
toward nickel (Calma 2020). However, nickel mining is also fraught with environmental and 
human rights concerns; Indigenous communities in Russia are campaigning Tesla directly to 
dissuade the company from contracting with a nickel mining firm that is polluting their land 
(Stone 2020), and nickel mining companies in Indonesia spurred by the EV boom are pursuing 
ecologically destructive waste disposal methods that involve dumping tailings into the ocean 
(Morse 2020). At the other end of the supply chain, electric vehicles produce considerable 
amounts of electronic waste (e-waste), which is often disposed of in the Global South, resulting 
in public health and safety concerns for local residents. For example, battery disposal and 
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recycling facilities in Ghana that use techniques such as acid leaching and burning have been 
linked to kidney failure and cancer in children and pregnant women (Sovacool et al. 2020). 
The EV supply chain is thus dependent on the exploitation and ecological degradation 
endemic to the extractive industries. The projected growth of the EV industry is expected to 
necessitate increased extraction of these metals; Deutsche Bank predicts that electric vehicles 
alone will make up 38 percent of all global lithium demand by 2025 (Coffin and Horowitz 2018). 
Overall, EV growth is expected drive significant increases in demand for lithium, cobalt, and 
nickel that will only be minimally offset by recycling and will require significant expansion of 
extractive infrastructure (Xu et al. 2020). In the following section, I explain how the EV 
industry’s projected growth and dependence on resource extraction are representative of broader 
trends within the green economy. 
 
3. Electric Vehicles and the Green Economy 
 The green economy has become a widespread concept among climate policy and 
advocacy professionals, and increasingly the general public. I begin this section with a historical 
review of the green economy and green growth. I next describe how the EV industry growth 
outlined previously fits into green economy narratives and policy programs. This is followed by 
an overview of prominent critiques of the green economy, and the role of EVs in these 
alternative framings. I conclude this section by situating the EVs’ role in green economy within 
the framework of environmental violence. 
3.1 Origins of Green Growth and the Green Economy 
The idea of a green economy has its roots in development paradigms devised by global 
financial and governance institutions in the 1980s. Institutions such as the World Bank and the 
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United Nations began to incorporate ecological concerns into their practices, coining the term 
“sustainable development” to describe economic development practices that took into account 
environmental sustainability (Brundtland et al. 1987). The term “green economy” emerged from 
this context, first in Blueprint for a Green Economy, a book prepared by the London 
Environmental Economics Center that proposed market-based policy solutions for limiting 
pollution and environmental degradation (Pearce, Markandya, and Barber 1989). 
Although sustainable development became widely recognized in subsequent decades, 
discourses around the green economy remained largely dormant until the global financial crises 
of 2008, when institutions such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) began to adopt “green 
economy” policy prescriptions as part of economic recovery programs. The UNEP asserted that 
achieving a green economy was necessary for sustainable development, noting that “The concept 
of a ‘green economy’ does not replace sustainable development, but there is now a growing 
recognition that achieving sustainability rests almost entirely on getting the economy right” 
(UNEP 2011, pp. 2).  
Organizations Green Economy/Green Growth Definitions 
UNEP “Moving towards a green economy has the potential to achieve 
sustainable development and poverty eradication on a scale 
and at a speed not seen before” (UNEP 2011, pp. 38) 
World Bank “Inclusive green growth is the pathway to sustainable 
development” (Fay 2012, pp. xi) 
OECD “Supporting sector restructuring towards fairer, greener 
economies …[would] be in line with national and international 
commitments made under the Paris Agreement, Sustainable 
Development Goals and other international environmental 
agreements” (OECD 2020, pp. 7) 
Box 1: Organizations relating green economy and green growth to sustainable development. 
“Getting the economy right,” as defined by the UNEP, hinged on effective capital 
valuation of natural resources and ecosystem sources, market-based approaches to 
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decarbonization, and perhaps most importantly, increasing economic growth. In fact, the report 
argued that a green economy would catalyze economic growth to an even greater degree than the 
alternative. The idea of “green growth” has subsequently become a dominant paradigm, touted as 
a key “pathway” to sustainable development by international financial institutions and 
governance organizations such as the World Bank and OECD (Gurría 2011, Fay 2012, OECD 
2020). 
3.2 EVs as a Component of the Green Economy 
Because EVs represent a considerable opportunity for both decarbonization and 
economic growth, they have become a key component of green economy and green growth 
narratives in the United States. In 2018, the transportation sector in the U.S. contributed 28 
percent of the country’s total greenhouse gas emissions, the largest share of any sector (EPA 
2020). Light-duty vehicles and commercial trucks, almost all of which run on fossil fuels, make 
up nearly 80 percent of the transportation sector (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2020). 
The electrification of these vehicles, combined with a shift to renewable energy generation, 
would contribute significantly toward cutting carbon emissions. 
Because of this potential, EVs also represent a significant opportunity for economic 
growth. The global number of electric vehicles is expected to increase from 5.1 million in 2018 
to as many as 250 million in 2030 (International Energy Agency 2019). American automakers 
such as Ford and General Motors are making significant investments in EVs (Northrup 2019), 
while EV manufacturer Tesla recently became the world’s most valuable car company 
(Klebnikov 2020). EV adoption is expected to drive increased consumption of electricity, 
therefore representing a growth opportunity for electric utility companies as well as automakers 
(Kapustin and Grushevenko 2020). The electric transportation (or “eMobility”) sector in the 
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United States alone is expected to be valued at $700 billion by 2040—value which can be 
captured by utilities through charging infrastructure, commodity sales, and rate structuring 
(Berthon et al. 2019). By presenting pathways for both decarbonization and economic growth, 
EVs have become a priority for American green economy advocates; so much so that increasing 
the number of EVs on the road in the U.S. has become a talking point for prominent Democratic 
party politicians (Manchester 2020). 
3.3 EVs and Green Economy Critiques 
EVs are also emblematic of prominent critiques of green growth and the green economy. 
The green economy’s adherence to growth, technological solutions, and the capitalization of 
nature can be seen as a sort of “green Keynesianism” that interprets “greening” as a preservation 
of current modes of production and consumption, facilitated by the production of new and better 
commodities (Goldstein 2018). EVs represent this improved commodity, the consumption of 
which is framed as an environmental and economic benefit. However, by preserving the U.S. 
auto industry’s modes of production and consumption, the green economy stands to preserve the 
inequalities the industry creates. The U.S. car system alone exacerbates inequalities across the 
country in employment access, wealth inequality, and environmental health (Lutz 2014). 
Henderson (2020) has argued that mass uptake of EVs is an impediment to mobility justice that 
may crowd out more equitable and lower-carbon transit planning solutions while contributing to 
green gentrification and inequities in energy consumption. 
Additionally, green growth dictates that these green commodities must be produced by an 
ever-growing economy. The OECD describes the impacts of climate change and ecological 
degradation as “imbalances which are putting economic growth and development at risk” (Gurría 
2011, pp. 17).  In other words, green growth holds that “environmental risk management is not 
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about the risks to the environment but rather the risks to [capitalist] accumulation” (Wanner 
2015, pp. 26). Thus, consumption of green commodities is framed as an environmental benefit, 
regardless of what risks economic growth itself might entail. Green growth is said to be enabled 
by “decoupling” emissions and material resource use from economic growth—in other words, 
maintaining or lowering emissions and resource throughput while increasing economic growth 
(Schandl et al. 2016). However, researchers have found little evidence of the feasibility of 
decoupling at a global scale or at the speed necessary to meet decarbonization targets (Vadén et 
al. 2020, Haberl et al. 2020, Hickel and Kallis 2020). In some cases, what appears to be 
decoupling in localized geographic areas is simply the relocation of emissions and material use 
elsewhere due to economic globalization (Moreau and Vuille 2018, Parrique et al. 2019). This 
suggests that green growth can be conceptualized as a variant of what Harvey (2001) calls a 
“spatial fix” of capitalism: it is dependent on shifting material use and emissions geographically 
in order to allow continued capitalist accumulation of wealth. 
Finally, scholars suggest that the green economy is an engine of uneven development. 
Lander (2011) has described the green economy as a tool of global finance intended to give the 
impression of incorporating environmentalist concerns while foreclosing the possibility of 
altering existing power structures or pursuing more transformative change. These power 
structures create a “decarbonization divide” wherein availability of green commodities in the 
Global North rests on the extraction of labor and resources from, and the dumping of waste in, 
the Global South (Sovacool et al. 2020, pp. 1). The growth of the EV industry poses particular 
threats in this regard; as EV production increases, so too will extraction of the metals required to 
produce them and disposal of the waste that they create. 
3.4 The Green Economy, Environmental Violence, and EVs 
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 Taken as a whole, the green economy can be seen as an engine of environmental 
violence, particularly along the divide between the Global North and Global South. Peluso and 
Watts define environmental violence as “a site-specific phenomenon rooted in local histories and 
social relations yet connected to larger processes of material transformation and power relations” 
(2001, p. 5). The green economy is characterized by the material transformation of natural 
resources into value through the production of green commodities. As a result, examples of 
environmental violence are commonly present at these sites of transformation, such as the 
inadequate compensation or consultation of local communities in the construction of wind farms 
in Oaxaca, Mexico (Dunlap 2017) or the “bureaucratic violence” of REDD+ carbon standards in 
Cambodia, which has resulted in land dispossession and state punishment of local Indigenous 
peoples (Milne and Mahanty 2019). 
 The growth of the EV industry is therefore also a driver of environmental violence. The 
aforementioned mining of lithium, cobalt, nickel, and other substances to supply EV batteries has 
resulted in significant harm to local communities at sites of extraction. The harms at mining sites 
along with the continued exploitation of labor as mined resources flow along the EV supply 
chain serve as examples of violence conceptualized as a process that unfolds through spatial and 
scalar dimensions along commodity chains (Le Billon 2007, Springer and Le Billon 2016).  
Thus, the EV industry produces particular forms of environmental violence as a 
constituent element of the green economy. However, the specific methods by which the EV 
industry perpetuates this violence are shaped by the sociopolitical relations that shape EV 
production. In the following section, I examine materialities of energy in order to better 
understand how they influence these sociopolitical relations. 
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4. Materialities of Energy 
 Recent scholarship has focused on how materialities of various energy sources—in other 
words, the material characteristics of a particular energy source such as its state of matter, 
location, dispersal, or other traits—affect the supply chain, infrastructure, and spatial distribution 
of these energy sources (Balmaceda et al. 2019). For example, the location of offshore oil 
reserves has resulted in the emergence of an offshore drilling industry that shapes social and 
political relations on and off the oil rig (Appel 2012), while the physical characteristics of oil 
wells in Russia have affected the ways that oil corporations respond to criticism and build 
relationships with local people (Rogers 2012). Research has shown how energy materialities 
have influenced prior global energy transitions, such as those from water mills to coal-fired 
plants during the industrial revolution and from coal to oil in the 20th century. However, there 
has been little examination of the energy materialities relevant to the current transition to 
renewable technologies. In this section, I discuss the role of energy materialities in past energy 
transitions, and then identify particular energy materialities that are shaping the transition to 
EVs. 
4.1 Energy Materialities and Historical Energy Transitions 
 Energy materialities have played a significant role in shaping energy transitions 
throughout history. Notably, the relationship between energy materialities and labor politics 
helped catalyze the transition from water-powered mills to coal-burning steam engines in 19th 
century Britain. Mill owners determined that being able to concentrate their factories in larger 
cities with plentiful labor, as opposed to investing in mills and settlements along unoccupied 
waterways, was worth the high cost and unreliability of coal (Malm 2016). In other words, 
materialities of hydropower—in particular the spatial characteristics of the waterways required to 
 14 
generate hydropower—were at odds with mill owners’ desires for a congregated labor base. The 
materiality of coal as a substance transportable along railways facilitated its emergence as an 
alternative. 
The transition to oil as a replacement for coal, which occurred gradually across much of 
the 20th century, featured a similar confluence of materiality, labor, and capitalist interests. 
Materialities of coal were such that mining and rail transport were integral parts of coal 
infrastructure, and both could be easily disrupted by strikes and sabotage. Oil, being a viscous 
liquid, relied on an infrastructure of pumps, pipelines, refineries, and ships rather than mines and 
railways. This infrastructure was both less fragile and less dependent on union workers. Oil 
could be shipped independently of railways due to pipeline infrastructure, and this pipeline 
infrastructure as well as the refineries themselves were reliant on a smaller number of technicians 
rather than a large, unionized labor force. Thus, the effort to transition from coal to oil was in no 
small part an effort, predicated on materialities of energy, to weaken organized labor (Mitchell 
2011). It is important, then, to attend to energy materialities as they relate to the ongoing 
transition to renewable energies, as doing so may reveal the political directions this transition 
might take. I posit that two characteristics of electric energy are particularly relevant in shaping 
the dynamics of the transition to EVs: temporality and spatial variability. 
4.2 Electricity and Temporality 
Access to electric power is often perceived as instantaneous; one flips a switch and a light 
bulb turns on. Indeed, the use of electric power is perceived in this way in EVs as well, as 
instantaneous acceleration is a common selling point in EV marketing. However, the time it 
takes to store electricity in a battery—the process required in order to charge an EV—is 
different, as it is governed by the physical and chemical properties of electricity. The speed of 
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charging an electric battery is determined by the rate at which the charger is able to deliver 
electricity to the battery, as well as the rate of diffusion of lithium ions from the cathode to the 
anode of the battery itself. Tesla’s third-generation Superchargers, for example, operate at a 
maximum charging rate of 250 kilowatts, which can add up to 200 miles of range to a Tesla’s 
charge in approximately 15 minutes (O’Kane 2019). Researchers and companies are exploring 
even more powerful chargers that operate at rates of 400 kilowatts and beyond (Meintz et al. 
2017). However, these extra-high-rate chargers can produce extreme heat in a battery pack as 
electricity flows through the resistive materials of the battery. High levels of resistive heat can 
degrade the battery and are potentially dangerous to the occupants of the vehicle. Additionally, 
ambient temperatures can affect the rate at which lithium ions diffuse within the battery, limiting 
the speed at which electricity is stored. As a result, manufacturers must explore solutions such as 
ambient temperature management, charging rate limiting, and battery cooling systems to manage 
these hazards (Tomaszewska et al. 2019, Xia et al. 2017).  
The technologies employed in EV batteries in order to facilitate faster charging while 
minimizing battery degradation and safety concerns must take into account the material 
properties of electricity—that is, the ways in which it interacts with the compounds within the 
battery. Thus, we see that the rate at which EV batteries can be charged is defined by 
materialities of electricity. We can think of this as a temporality of electricity, where the material 
properties of electricity are significant through time. 
4.3 Electricity and Spatial Variation 
The geographic variation of electricity generation, distribution, and regulation is also a 
significant component of energy materiality. In the United States, the distribution of sources of 
electricity varies widely by state, and is split between coal, natural gas, hydroelectric, nuclear, 
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and renewables such as solar and wind, among other sources (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration 2019). Geography and ecology play significant roles in determining these 
distributions. For example, Alaska’s energy grid is self-contained due to its relative isolation and 
thus largely dependent on locally feasible power sources such as hydroelectric and natural gas. 
Many Great Plains states such as North Dakota, Nebraska, and Oklahoma have been historically 
dependent on coal and natural gas, but their flat expanses of land have enabled wind energy to 
gain rapidly in recent years. Meanwhile, states in the Pacific Northwest such as Washington and 
Oregon that see heavy precipitation make extensive use of hydroelectric power (Popovich 2018). 
Additionally, regulatory regimes and financial considerations such as corporate tax rates and 
construction costs vary widely by location, which significantly influences how energy generation 
and transmission projects are pursued in different locations. At present, the economic 
competitiveness of various renewable and nonrenewable energy generation technologies varies 
widely based on geographic and regulatory constraints (Dell et al. 2017).  
Regulatory regimes can influence local energy materiality indirectly and at a global scale 
as well. For example, water regulations in Chile allow the lithium mining firms that are 
indispensable for EV consumption in the Global North to pump water at rates that result in 
shortages for local residents (Babidge 2015, Sherwood 2018). The disparate effects of how the 
materiality of energy is felt by populations and ecosystems based on local and global power 
dynamics constitute “uneven geographies of energy materiality,” that is, an analytical lens 
through which we can understand the ways that energy materiality manifests in uneven 
development or access (Balmaceda et al. 2019, pp. 7). This uneven development has implications 
not only for who is affected by resource extraction for EVs, as in the case of Chile’s lithium 
mines, but also how EVs are priced and who has access to them.   
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I have previously drawn on the literature, public documents, and news articles to discuss 
how EVs fit into the green economy and explain how materialities of electricity stand to affect 
the transition to EVs. Next, I incorporate findings from my own research in order to demonstrate 
how EV companies and electric utilities are navigating materialities of electricity and the 
resulting sociopolitical implications. I outline my research methods in the following section 
before proceeding to a discussion of the results. 
 
5. Research Methods 
 Building on previous works by Rogers (2012) and Appel (2012), the objective of this 
research is to examine how corporations engage materialities of environment and energy, and to 
uncover the politics of the green economy that emerges as a result. Having established an 
understanding of energy materialities and the green economy, I analyze corporate engagement 
with these energy materialities through qualitative research focused on corporate employees.  
I conducted interviews with 11 key informants working in the EV industry. Interviewees 
were composed of employees at automobile companies, electric utilities, and consulting firms 
focused on EV applications. Interviews were conducted remotely via videoconference between 
May and August 2020, and each interview was approximately one hour long. All participants 
were located in the United States; five were in Michigan, while the remaining participants were 
based in California, Colorado, Georgia, Arizona, and Illinois. Interviews were semi-structured; 
each participant was asked the same general questions about the nature of their work, their 
thoughts on the current and future state of the EV industry, and how they interacted with other 
actors in the industry. However, discussions were open-ended and varied widely. 
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 Limitations of this study include the number of interviewees and the disproportionate 
number of respondents in Michigan, both a result of “snowballing” personal and professional 
contact networks as a method of identifying participants. For the purpose of this study, 
identifying informants based in the U.S. who were closer to the consumer side was appropriate, 
as the scope of this study is limited to how energy materialities affect companies’ actions in 
relation to consumer experiences. However, including informants along the entirety of the EV 
commodity chain could reflect a more comprehensive picture of how energy materialities are 
articulated in the global economy. Future studies could benefit from a more systematic approach 
to identifying participants, or conversely a focus on one particular region. 
 
6. “The Gasoline of the Future:” Points of Continuity and Energy Materialities 
 My conversations with informants in the EV industry elicited two main findings. First, 
EV industry actors seek to create what I call “points of continuity” between gasoline and electric 
vehicles: material and narrative aspects of the automobile that are preserved across the energy 
transition in order to smooth the user experience. Second, the EV industry needs to navigate 
materialities of energy in order to create these points of continuity. In other words, as in prior 
energy transitions, capitalist accumulation and energy materialities are interacting to shape the 
way that industry is navigating the transition to EVs. 
6.1 Points of Continuity and the Gas Station Experience 
When I asked an electric utility employee based in Arizona what was appealing to 
electric utility companies about a transition to EVs, the employee put it bluntly: “We’re going to 
be the gasoline of the future.” This narrative-setting rhetoric emerges from EV industry actors’ 
creation of what I call points of continuity between gasoline and electric vehicles. I define these 
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points of continuity as features of the relationship between a consumer and an EV designed to 
replicate specific aspects of the experience of operating a gasoline-powered vehicle. Points of 
continuity can be found across the consumer experience, from ensuring that EV acceleration 
numbers match or exceed that of comparable gasoline vehicles to striving for an EV battery 
range comparable to the distance a gasoline vehicle might travel on a single tank. Box 2 displays 
three such examples of points of continuity between electric and gasoline vehicles and the 
strategies EV industry actors are pursuing in order to create them. Informants were insistent that 
points of continuity would be necessary for the widespread of adoption of EVs. In other words, 
they asserted that points of continuity could contribute to a smooth, universal experience across 
geographies and regulatory regimes for EV consumers, similar to that of gasoline car consumers. 
 Refueling Duration Range between 
Refueling 
Refueling Pricing 
Gasoline Vehicle Typically under 5 minutes at 
gasoline pump 
Dependent on fuel 
efficiency of vehicle and 
size of gas tank 
Flat rate for gasoline 
varies by region and over 
short term, dependent on 
federal and state gasoline 
tax 
Electric Vehicle Varies widely based on 
kilowattage of charger and EV 
battery; fastest available is 
around 15 minutes 
Dependent on battery size 
and energy density 
Charging cost dependent 
on time of day, energy 





Increasing kW of electric 
chargers and voltage of 
batteries; changing material 
composition of batteries to 
handle faster charging 
Use of larger and more 
energy-dense batteries in 
EVs 
Collaboration between 
automakers and electric 
utilities to devise simpler 
pricing plans, ideally flat 
rate, for EV charging 
 
 
One point of continuity that came up repeatedly in conversation with informants was the 
“gas station experience”—being able to charge an EV in a short duration comparable to the time 
it takes to fill up a tank of gas. The temporality of the gas station experience is seen as a crucial 
point of continuity between the experiences of gasoline and EV consumers. “The important 
Box 2: Example points of continuity between gasoline and 
electric vehicles. 
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[chargers],” said a consultant based in Michigan, “will be the fast chargers so that you can 
operate your electric car like you do your gasoline car today.” A nonprofit and consulting 
employee for another firm based in Michigan, also speaking about fast charging, echoed this 
sentiment: “That would allow you to essentially put 200 plus miles of range in a vehicle in 10 
minutes or less. That's often referred to as the gas station experience.” Perhaps most illustrative 
was a comment from a utility employee based in Georgia. “You never think about that with a gas 
car, ‘I can't put gas in as fast as I would want to’—that would never enter your mind.” 
6.2 Temporality and the Gas Station Experience 
 The phrase “gas station experience” could refer to any number of experiences 
characteristic of refueling a vehicle at a gas station: the method of payment, the availability of 
amenities such as a convenience store or maintenance facilities, or the spatial distribution of gas 
stations along highways. However, EV industry actors are quite open to altering many of these 
other factors. Various informants highlighted automatic payment by smartphone for charging 
services, chargers located at office parks that could be utilized while owners went to work, and 
vehicle-to-grid reverse charging as changes they were pursuing in the vehicle refueling 
experience. The CEO of ChargePoint, one of the largest American EV charger companies, has 
cautioned against infrastructure plans that follow a gas station model in terms of location, instead 
encouraging policymakers to site chargers at businesses (Stock 2020). 
 The gas station experience as it relates to EV charging, then, refers specifically to the 
temporal aspect of refueling. The fact that charging an EV typically takes longer than refueling a 
gasoline car is a product of electricity and EV batteries’ materialities. Although charging at home 
is a solution for some consumers, it does not allay range anxiety on longer trips. As one 
automaker employee based in Michigan put it, “[DC fast charging] takes away a lot of concern 
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about range anxiety it because it starts to act more like what [consumers] are used to with a 
gasoline powered vehicle that gets, you know, 350 to 450, 500 miles of range on a tank of gas.” 
In other words, the gas station experience is required to allow consumers to use their EVs in the 
same way they would their gasoline cars. In order to enable this, researchers are developing new 
types of EV batteries that can better handle the demands of fast charging. These batteries have 
different chemical compositions from their predecessors, such as silicon or lithium-based 
compounds in their anodes rather than graphite (Tomaszewska et al. 2019). Thus, the EV 
industry’s pursuit of the gas station experience as a point of continuity is a specific response to 
electricity’s temporality—one that is literally changing the way that EV batteries are made, 
shaping the direction of the industry itself.   
6.3 Spatiality and the Cost of Charging 
Price-setting at the pump is another specific aspect of the gas station experience which is 
used as a point of continuity. Though gas prices differ across the country, they fall within a 
relatively predictable range that remains reasonably stable over the short term. Electric charging 
rates present a different challenge, as they are dependent on such variables as load on the 
electrical grid, utility rate structure, and other factors. Current EV charging services like Tesla’s 
Supercharger network offer arrays of charging rates that may vary depending on these variables 
(Fig. 4). Some charging network companies such as EVGo require subscription packages in 
order to use charging infrastructure. Interviewees at automakers and utilities alike voiced their 
desire for flat charging rates similar to gas prices, echoing the gas station experience.  
One utility employee based in Colorado described a number of potential solutions the 
utility was considering in order to achieve a flat fee for EV charging, including billing home EV 
charging separately from the customer’s overall electric bill. The employee noted that “the 
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market’s gearing more and more towards much more predictable rates.” However, some 
informants were skeptical of the possibility. A utility employee based in Arizona lamented, 
“gasoline prices are semi-consistent across the US; a lot of it depends on taxes. But EV charging 
all depends on what the utility’s rate design is, and these people are dealing with, everybody's 
got something different.” Despite the fact that EV charging tends to be significantly less 
expensive than gasoline fill-ups—an ostensible draw for consumers—interview participants still 
















Figure 3: Flowchart illustrating how rates are determined when 
using a Tesla Supercharger. 
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Achieving this flat rate, however, can be challenging in part due to energy materialities. 
Varied materialities of electricity across spatial difference contribute to varied geographies of 
energy, with different methods of generation, patterns of use, and costs. As one automaker 
employee based in Michigan put it, “the recipe that works in California is not going to be the 
recipe that works in Texas, or Florida, or Ohio, or Maine. They all got to be different recipes.” In 
other words, ratemaking strategies would need to respond to spatialities of energy. Informants 
were intimately aware of the way that differences in energy materiality impacted their 
approaches to EV infrastructure initiatives. The same utility employee in Arizona who bemoaned 
the difficulty of establishing a uniform price for EV charging attributed this difficulty in part to 
climate and geography. The employee noted, “It also makes a difference whether you're in 
Detroit in February, or you're in Phoenix in February. Right? Because we're not supplying a lot 
of heating load in February here, so we've got a lot of spare capacity on our system in the 
springtime, whereas in countries, places where it's cooler, they don’t.” This employee noted the 
effects of regional climate patterns on grid capacity and electricity pricing. In other words, 
electricity’s materialities—in particular its spatial variation caused by differences in climate and 
generation type—are an impediment to establishing a flat EV charging rate as a point of 
continuity with gas prices. 
 
7. Discussion 
In this thesis I have introduced the concept of points of continuity: particular features of 
the gasoline vehicle user experience that the EV industry seeks to replicate in EVs in order to 
increase EV adoption. I have used this idea to illustrate how the EV industry encourages 
adoption and incorporates EVs into the green economy. I have also shown that points of 
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continuity can be dependent on materialities of energy. Here, I discuss how these key findings 
influence: (1) the making of the green economy predicated on green capitalism; (2) the 
emergence of “energopower” and the politics of points of continuity; and (3) how these two 
strands intersect to perpetuate and maintain environmental violence. I posit that the EV 
industry’s pursuit of points of continuity in response to materialities of electricity is an 
expression of political power by which this case for growth is made, and that it ultimately stands 
to perpetuate the environmental violence of green capitalism. 
7.1 The “How” of Green Capitalism 
Green economy narratives create space for the EV industry to assert its position as the 
dominant mode of “green” transportation in the United States, making the case for growth 
among automakers and utilities while obscuring concerns about the inequalities this growth 
would exacerbate. I have shown that the creation of points of continuity is a corporate strategy 
intended to facilitate the adoption of EVs without showing how energy is transformed, 
transported, and commodified. Extra-fast charging and a flat rate for charging serve as two such 
examples. Recall also the EV advertisements displayed in Figure 1: by employing phrases such 
as “go anywhere” and “charge once a week on average,” EV manufacturers tout points of 
continuity related to charging and EV range. Points of continuity such as these are attempts to 
incorporate materialities of electricity into arrangements that enable the use of EVs in as similar 
a way as possible to gasoline vehicles. By minimizing potential behavioral changes demanded of 
consumers, points of continuity are intended to facilitate the expansion of the EV industry, and 
therefore the green economy. 
These results have implications for the ways in which energy is transformed along global 
supply chains from raw material to labor to commodity. In an ethnographic study of offshore oil 
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drilling workers, Hannah Appel finds that global capitalism requires a great deal of work from 
capitalists in order to corral its heterogeneities into a coherent form that allows for the 
maintenance of profit and power; she calls this “the ‘how’ of capitalism” (2012). We see that the 
EV industry contends with materialities of electricity in order to establish points of continuity 
while maintaining mainstream green economy and green growth narratives. The creation of 
points of continuity can thus be seen as a “how” of green capitalism. EV companies respond to 
materialities of electricity by attempting to create points of continuity. These materialities are 
shaping the contours of green capitalism, inducing extra work by EV companies in the form of 
establishing points of continuity. In so doing, EV companies maintain mainstream notions of the 
green economy. In the following section, I discuss how these strategies construct politics which 
discourage forms of change that might pose threats to EV industry practices. 
7.2 “Energopower” and the Politics of Points of Continuity 
As my results show, points of continuity are essential to sustaining EV growth in the 
United States. These points of continuity create political landscapes which can be interpreted as 
formations of what Cederlöf calls “energopower:” the ways that “particular configurations of 
energy and political power shape the conditions of social, political, and economic possibility” 
(2019, pp. 79). The creation of points of continuity by automakers and utilities can be seen as a 
strategy toward consolidation of political power. For automakers, growing the EV industry is a 
means of maintaining their existing hegemonic power over American transportation systems in 
the face of an impending energy transition. For utilities, it is an attempt to capitalize on this 
evolution of the automotive industry that renders them providers of “the gasoline of the future.” 
In order to achieve these goals, automakers and utilities in the EV industry must facilitate a 
 26 
smooth transition to EVs, surmounting any obstacles that might disrupt American patterns of car 
use and consumption.  
Ultimately, the creation of points of continuity in order to surmount these obstacles 
forecloses political possibilities that might threaten capital accumulation of utilities and 
automakers. Although points of continuity are a strategy employed by EV industry companies to 
attempt to navigate contradictions between energy materialities and capitalist accumulation, 
creating points of continuity exposes new contradictions, such as the growing evidence that mass 
vehicle electrification in the U.S. may not facilitate carbon reduction quickly enough to 
adequately mitigate the effects of climate change. Despite the growth of the EV industry being 
billed as a solution itself, it is unlikely that mass electrification of the existing fleet of light-duty 
vehicles will meet U.S. decarbonization targets; rather, adoption of EVs must be accompanied by 
an overall reduction in automobile use (Alarfaj et al. 2020, Milovanoff et al. 2020). U.S. 
President Joseph R. Biden Jr.’s recently announced plan to build 500,000 charging stations was 
hailed by the EV industry (Stock 2020)—despite research showing that a mass buildout of fast 
charging infrastructure across the U.S. is likely to see diminishing returns on greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction and return on investment (Levinson & West 2018). 
 Thus, by creating points of continuity, automakers and utilities encourage mass EV 
adoption without reductions in car usage, despite ambiguity as to whether this is an effective or 
equitable emissions reductions strategy. Through points of continuity, automakers and utilities 
create political conditions which leverage goodwill built through green economy narratives to 
maintain their power. As such, the creation of points of continuity by EV industry actors can be 
seen as an exercise of “energopower.” As I explain in the following section, these political 
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conditions are not limited to U.S. decarbonization strategies—they have far-reaching effects that 
ultimately maintain environmental violence across the globe. 
7.3 Points of Continuity, Green Capitalism, and Environmental Violence 
 
“This is a good story for everyone. It's good for utilities, but it's also good for the 
environment, and it's also good for society at large.”- Michigan utility employee 
 
The quote above emphasizes that a defining characteristic of EVs is that they are 
beneficial for both industry and environment. However, an analysis of points of continuity and 
critiques of the green economy call these narratives into question. The growth of the EV 
industry, facilitated by points of continuity, stands to perpetuate the environmental violence of 
green capitalism. 
Automakers and utilities alike leverage green economy and green growth discourses to 
justify their involvement in the EV industry; automakers must sell EVs to grow their business in 
the face of a looming energy transition, while utilities and charging infrastructure providers seek 
to capitalize on this growth as the new providers of “fuel” for automobiles. As we have seen in 
the previous section, this is an exercise of political power designed to preserve and expand the 
EV industry. We see in these examples a demonstration of the ways that green economy and 
green growth narratives are deployed not as solutions to anthropogenic climate change and 
ecological damage, but rather as answers to the threats that climate change and ecological 
damage pose to the growth and economic viability of industry. As narratives of green growth 
embraced by EV industry actors obscure concerns about whether EV industry growth is the 
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optimal solution for equitable decarbonization of transportation, they also elide the green 
economy’s tendency toward uneven development and harms at sites of extraction. 
Nations across the Global South that possess sizable reserves of crucial EV materials 
such as lithium, cobalt, and nickel face pressure to develop their own economies through 
extraction of these resources. These pressures, largely driven by increasing demand for these 
materials across the Global North, are creating stark divides in “sustainability” discourses as 
governments, Indigenous peoples, organized labor, and other affiliated parties grapple over the 
dilemmas of resource extraction and development (Hollender 2015, Riofrancos 2017). These 
conflicts engender resistance among affected peoples at sites of extraction, as demonstrated by 
the numerous protests by rural and Indigenous populations across the globe at mining sites that 
supply materials for EV batteries (Stone 2020, Morse 2020, Deep Green Resistance 2021). The 
2019 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP25) was rocked by protests led by 
Indigenous activists that challenged the maintenance of extractivism and North/South 
exploitation in climate and environmental policy typical of green economic development 
(Ramirez 2019). The universalist narratives of social progress applied to the green economy 
erase these conflicts, creating an illusion of universal benefit while extraction and displacement 
continue. 
I have noted that green economy narratives obscure the environmental and social harms 
of green growth, using the example of mining for EVs. The impacts of mining expansion on 
communities at sites of extraction can be characterized as environmental violence; thus the green 
economy and green growth can be seen as drivers of environmental violence. It follows that 
because points of continuity are a strategy used by automakers and utilities to expand the EV 
industry, they contribute to the environmental violence driven by green growth. Additionally, by 
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working to maintain and even expand patterns of car use among U.S. consumers, the EV 
industry’s creation of points of continuity maintains “business as usual,” thereby keeping the 
global environmental violence of the EV industry opaque. 
 
8. Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis is to draw attention to interactions between energy 
materialities, corporate strategies, and environmental violence, and to introduce the concept of 
points of continuity into critical analyses of green capitalism, the green economy, and renewable 
energy transitions. As global energy systems move unevenly toward renewable technologies, 
many scholars, activists, and members of the public are concerned with the sociopolitical and 
environmental justice impacts of clean energy technologies.  
The literature around the green economy and energy materialities illustrates the impacts 
of both energy materialities and corporate actors on prior and current energy transitions, 
particularly within the context of labor, human rights, and ecological degradation. Automakers 
and utilities utilize green economy discourses to increase EV adoption and grow their businesses. 
However, mainstream conceptions of the green economy and green growth prioritize capital 
accumulation over ecological balance and are criticized as drivers of uneven and unsustainable 
development. Energy materialities can shape the ways that these patterns of accumulation, 
consumption, and socio-ecological impacts are distributed. It is thus important to attend to the 
ways that energy materialities, green economy narratives, and corporate strategies might affect 
current and future energy transitions.  
Through my research, I have shown that automakers and utilities create points of 
continuity by replicating specific aspects of the experience of operating a gasoline vehicle in 
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EVs. These points of continuity, such as extra-fast charging and flat charging rates, are a means 
of navigating electricity’s spatial and temporal variations and materialities while facilitating a 
transition to EVs. By establishing points of continuity, EV industry actors minimize behavioral 
changes for consumers and maximize EV adoption. However, points of continuity also serve to 
configure political power and capitalist accumulation, ultimately perpetuating the environmental 
violence of green capitalism. As such, points of continuity expose social and environmental 
contradictions created by patterns of consumption incentivized by capitalist interests.  
By thinking of points of continuity as strategies that can reveal socio-ecological 
contradictions in corporate and state management of a transition to a green economy, we might 
envision broader applications of this framework beyond the EV industry. How might points of 
continuity, for example, shape political ecologies of the emerging lab-grown meat industry, 
which is itself an effort to create continuity between traditional and lab-grown meat while 
reducing environmental impacts (Sergelidis 2019)? By investigating the ways that powerful 
entities such as corporations and states deploy points of continuity, we can uncover 
contradictions in the construction of green capitalism that might help activists and thinkers 
devise pathways toward alternative modes of production and consumption. Countering these 
strategies with more reciprocal relationships between humans and energy materialities will be 
important for building futures that avoid and address the patterns of exploitation embodied in the 
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